This paper considers the problem of a Principal (she) who faces a privately informed agent (he) and only knows one moment of the type distribution. Preferences are nonlinear in the allocation and the Principal maximizes her worst-case expected profits. A robustness property of the optimal mechanism imposes restrictions on the principal's ex-post payoff function: conditional on the allocation being non-zero, ex-post payoffs are linear in the agent's type. The robust mechanism entails exclusion of low types, distortions at the intensive margin and efficiency at the top. We show that, under some conditions, distortions in the optimal mechanism are decreasing in types. This monotonicity has relevant consequences for several applications discussed. Our characterization uses an auxiliary zero-sum game played by the Principal and an adversarial Nature who seeks to minimize her expected payoffs which also gives us a characterization of the worst-case distribution from the principal's perspective. Applications of our framework to insurance provision, optimal taxation, non-linear pricing and regulation are discussed.
Introduction
In many situations, mechanism designers with access to limited data might not be able to formulate a prior distribution regarding all information unobserved by them, or might avoid mechanisms whose performance is very sensitive to small changes in the prior. As a consequence, a growing literature studies principal-agent problems in which the Principal (she) is (partially) ignorant about the distribution from which the agent's (he) private information is drawn (e.g., Bergemann and Schlag (2008) , Carroll (2013) , Carrasco et al. (2015) , Kos and Messner (2015) and Carrasco et al. (2017) ). 1 One common feature of this literature is the assumption of linearity in the agent's and the principal's utility functions. However, non-linearity in preferences are at the crux of many important applications of mechanism design theory such as monopolistic screening, taxation, insurance, and regulation. For instance, a monopolist designing the optimal quality/price menu needs to account for decreasing marginal value of quality in consumer's preferences. One of the central objectives of optimal tax system is the provision of incentives for work or effort, which depend on labor elasticities deriving from curvature in the labor cost functions. The underlying motive for insurance provision is risk sharing. Effort towards cost reduction in a regulatory setting are typically hindered by decreasing returns of effort. In this paper, we fill this gap by considering a single agent mechanism design problem in which (i) payoffs are nonlinear in the allocation and (ii) the Principal knows only the first moment of the distribution from which the agent's types is drawn. In face of such uncertainty, she maximizes her worstcase expected profits. We call the mechanism that results of such procedure the "robust mechanism". By construction, the robust mechanism generates the highest performance guarantee based solely on the moment information available to the Principal. The environment we consider is general enough to have, as particular cases, Mussa and Rosen (1978) 's screening setting, a simplified model of taxation following Mirrlees (1971) , optimal monopolistic insurance provision with preferences following Einav et al. (2013) and Laffont and Tirole (1986) 's regulation model. All examples are described in detail in Section 3. For concreteness, we consider throughout the screening application. The requirement that the Principal has some knowledge of the distribution is key to making the problem interesting. If one assumes complete ignorance on the side of the Principal, i.e., that all probability distributions are possible, the problem has a trivial solution. The triviality follows from the fact that the worst possible distribution for the Principal involves an agent that has the lowest possible type with probability one. As in Bergemann and Schlag (2008) , Carrasco et al. (2015) and Kos and Messner (2015) , we solve the problem by characterizing equilibria of an auxiliary zero-sum game played by the Principal and an adversarial Nature, who chooses distribution for the agent's private information to minimize the designer expected payoffs. A Nash equilibrium of such game is characterized by the robust mechanism and the worst-case distribution from the principal's perspective.
Our characterization resolves new technical challenges arising from the introduction of nonlinearities in preferences. We show that the optimal mechanism is characterized by the property that the ex-post payoff of the Principal is piecewise linear in the agent's realized type. The restrictions coming from the piecewise linearity on ex-post payoffs induce an ordinary differential equation that determines the robust allocation. By analyzing the properties of this differential system we are able to show that an optimal mechanism exists and obtain its efficiency properties. This differential equation is trivial in the linear case considered in Carrasco et al. (2015) . The piecewise linear property comes from the fact that the first moment of the distribution is known and hence the Principal desires a mechanism in which her expected payoff depends only on the first moment of the distribution.
The piecewise linearity of the payoff function implies that a large set of feasible distributions generate the same expected payoff to the Principal. More precisely, if the Principal picks a piecewise mechanism, Nature is indifferent among all feasible distributions that put probability one on positive trade occurring. We then construct a specific optimal distribution such that the piecewise linear mechanism aforementioned is optimal in the classical sense.
This result gives us the characterization of the Nash equilibrium.
We also characterize the profile of distortions in the optimal allocation in Section 5. The optimal allocation shares features with the classical literature with known distribution: it also features downward distortions in quality provision, with the only highest type obtaining efficient provision, and possible exclusion of a set of low types. In order to understand how distortions vary across types, we define the concept of wedges which gives a measure of how different the optimal allocation is from the first-best allocation. In the examples of nonlinear pricing and taxation, wedges coincide with the gap between marginal prices and marginal costs, and the marginal tax rates, respectively. Our strongest characterization result (Proposition 4) shows that, for sufficiently large distribution averages, wedges are strictly decreasing in the region of types with positive trade. While this monotonicity result requires strong assumptions on the type distribution in classical mechanism design problems with curvature, it is a direct consequence of the differential equation describing the robust mechanism in our distribution-free environment, depending only on the average of the distribution.
Related literature
Our paper is part of a growing literature on mechanism design with principals with maximin preferences. 2 Garrett (2014) considers the case of a Principal who does not know the producer's disutility of effort, and shows that a simple fixed-price-cost-reimbursement (FPCR) menu minimizes the Principal's maximum expected payment to the agent. In Carroll (2015) , the Principal only partially knows the set of actions available to the agent; he shows that if the Principal maximizes expected profits under worst-case set of actions, the optimal contract is linear in output. We, in turn, assume that payoffs are common knowledge, and consider the implications of uncertainty regarding the distribution of types. The papers that are closest to ours are part of the robust pricing literature pioneered by Bergemann and Schlag (2008, 2011) . Bergemann and Schlag (2008) consider the case in which the seller designs a mechanism to minimize the maximum regret, whereas Bergemann and Schlag (2011) also consider a maximin procedure where the set of distributions is defined to be a neighborhood in the Prokhorov metric. Carrasco et al. (2015) and Kos and Messner (2015) build on a similar setting in which only one moment of the distribution of willingness to pay of the consumer is known. 3 Carroll (2017) considers a buyer-seller problem with multiple goods when the seller knows the marginal value distribution for each potential buyer but she is ignorant about the joint distribution. Our paper differs from all of these by considering the case of nonlinearity in preferences.
Model
There is a Principal and and agent, who is privately informed about a single dimensional parameter θ, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, that affects his payoff. The principal's payoff derived from quality level q ≥ 0 and transfer t ∈ R is t − c (q) , where c (·) is interpreted as the principal's quality cost function. The agent's utility is given by u (q, θ) − t. The (net) surplus function is given by s(q, θ) := u (q, θ) − c (q). We assume that u (·) and c (·) are both twice continuously differentiable. Let subscript q denote the partial derivative with respect to variable q. Thus, for example, s q = ∂s ∂q . Second derivatives sand s qθ are analogously defined. We assume the surplus maximization problem is concave, i.e, function s (·) satisfies, for all θ > 0, s q (0, 1) > 0 and s(q, θ) < 0.
( Assumption 1)
We also assume that null production generates zero surplus (i.e., s (0, θ) = 0), as well as the following conditions on the marginal surplus function:
By Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, the first-best allocation is uniquely defined. We then denote the first-best allocation as q F B (θ) and the top first-best allocation as q 1 ≡ q F B (1) . Moreover, if s q (0, θ) > 0, then q F B (θ) > 0 and s q (q F B (θ), θ) = 0. If s q (0, 0) < 0, then inf θ | q F B (θ) > 0 > 0, i.e., the first-best solution features exclusion. If this condition is not satisfied, there is no first-best exclusion and eventually no exclusion in our robust solution.
We follow the literature and assume that u (·) satisfies the single-crossing property:
for any θ ∈ (0, 1) and q ≥ 0. Assumption 3 is equivalent to Finally, let us assume that the ratio between marginal surplus and marginal rent
This assumption, the only which is not standard in design problems, is used to guarantee that the principal's objective function is quasi-concave when evaluated at the worst-case distribution chosen by Nature.
From the revelation principle we restrict attention on the set of direct mechanisms defined as
The Principal trades quality q for monetary transfer t and only has information about the average of the type distribution.
We depart from the usual assumption on the knowledge of the distribution by the Principal by assuming that she only knows the first moment k ∈ [0, 1] of the distribution from which types are drawn. The set of possible distributions is then
In face of such uncertainty, she maximizes her worst-case expected payoffs among the direct mechanisms in which the agent is truthful and participates:
4 The case where k ≤ θ leads to zero payoff to the Principal in a trivial way. By considering the Dirac distribution δ k , one can see that
(2)
We refer to any mechanism satisfying (2) as feasible and the set of feasible mechanisms is denoted as M * . In order to simplify the analysis, we use the standard envelope formula proposed by Myerson (1981) in order to write the principal's problem in terms of the allocation q (·). For this, define the set of bounded allocations as
The following result is quite standard in the mechanism design literature, and hence we omit its proof. Lemma 1. In any mechanism m = (q, t) ∈ M * , the principal's ex-post payoff satisfies
From now on, we reduce the optimization problem of the Principal to choosing only quality levels q (·), i.e.,
If q * solves problem (3), it follows from Lemma 1 that the mechanism m q * = q * , t q * solves problem (1) . In the remainder of the paper we will solve problem (3).
Applications

Monopolistic screening
Our model encompasses Mussa and Rosen (1978) 's model of screening with non-linear utility over quality. A consumer of type θ ∈ [0, 1] has utility over quality q ≥ 0 and prices paid t ∈ R given by u (q, θ) − t. While the cost of quality provision is given by c (q). Our model can accommodate, for example, decreasing or non-monotonic marginal utility over quality. 5 More specifically, if we assume that u (q, θ) = u 0 (q) θ, for some positive C 2 and concave increasing function u 0 with u 0 (0) = 0, while the cost function satisfies
Then all assumptions required for the analysis are satisfied.
Taxation
Our general framework also encompasses a simple version of the optimal taxation questions proposed by Mirrlees (1971) . In our example we focus on the incentive provision aspect of taxation and abstract from the question of redistribution.
An agent has utility over final consumption −t ∈ R and works level q ∈ R + given by
where z > 0 is a parameter affecting the elasticity of labor supply. Now define the disutility from labor by u 0 (q, θ) ≡ − (q+z) 2 2(θ+z) . We assume that the outside option of the agent is zero production and consumption, which is given by − z 2 2(θ+z) . To simplify the model, we define the excess disutility from labor as
.
The Principal minimizes the impact of the taxation mechanism on its overall budget. Hence, the Principal's problem becomes the maximization of
which fits in our general setting with cost function c(q) = −q. It is easy to check this model also satisfies the assumptions required for our analysis. Notice that all the assumptions in our model are satisfied.
Insurance
We now propose a model of insurance provision with privately observed risk aversion fitting within our general framework. This parametric framework is based on Einav et al. (2013) .
Consider an agent with wealth W who can suffer loss l ∈ R distributed according to N (µ 0 , 1). The agent's ex-post utility over final consumption is given by CARA utility with parameter θ > 0. If a consumer pays a premium t > 0 to cover a share q ∈ [0, 1] of his loss, 6 the ex-post utility given parameter θ and loss l ∈ R is given bỹ
Parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] measures the absolute risk aversion level of the agent. We assume that this parameter is privately observed by the agent. The agent's expected utility from
is the expected operator with respect to the loss l. Applying monotone transformation u → − log (−u) we have an alternative representation of the agent's preferences given by
while the outside option of agent θ ∈ [0, 1] is u (θ) ≡ u 1 (0, 0, θ). Since our model has quasilinear preferences and zero outside option, we consider the following utility function which represents the same preference relation for each type:
The cost of delivering coverage q is given by the expected payments made out to the agent and hence is equal to c (q) = µ 0 q. It is easy to check that these functions satisfy all of our assumptions, with the caveat that the allocation is restricted to [0, 1] and Assumption Assumption 3 does not hold as a strict inequality at q = 1. However, our results can easily be extended to cover this case.
Procurement and regulation
In the celebrated Laffont and Tirole (1986)'s model of procurement/regulation, cost realizations are observable and the firm's manager (agent) undertakes costly efforts to reduce its unobservable natural cost (type). Optimal second-best contracts, which feature the usual trade-off between cost reduction effort and informational rents, heavily rely on the planner's (principal's) knowledge on the firm's preference and the type distribution. Such information requirements may not be realistic and require a more robust approach to the contract design. The approach adopted in this paper allows us to investigate the situation with limited information on the distribution, i.e., the planner only knows the mean of the distribution. For instance, first-time interactions in regulation/procurement or rapidly changing technology may lead to ambiguity over priors on types. 7 Suppose that a planner is required to procure (or regulate the provision of) an indivisible good from a firm. The observable cost provision is x = η − e, where η ∈ [η, η] is the natural efficiency parameter and e is the unobservable cost reduction effort taken by the firm's manager. The manager inflicts in a disutility ψ(e) to reduce the natural cost η to x, where ψ(0) = 0, ψ ′ , ψ ′′ > 0 and ψ ′′′ ≥ 0. Let τ be the total payment made to the firm and, therefore, the firm's payoff is s(
Defining θ = (η − η)/∆η and q = x − x, the firm's utility can be equivalently written as
The planner's problem is to minimize the total payment to the firm τ or, equivalently, to maximize t (in this case c(q) = 0). If the planner wants to protect against least favorable scenario on possible type distribution having the same mean, maximin becomes a natural criterium. The assumptions of this paper readily apply also in this setting.
Robust mechanism as a Nash equilibrium
It is useful to recast the maximin problem as a zero-sum game, played by the Principal and an adversarial Nature, who chooses distributions to minimize the principal's expected payoff.
More precisely, consider a strategic form game with two players, identified as Principal and Nature. The strategy sets for the Principal and Nature are, respectively, Q and F . The payoff function for both players in this game are
If (q * , F * ) is a Nash equilibrium of this game, then q * solves the maximin problem and u P (q * , F * ) is the optimal robust payoff to the Principal. This game also allows us to charac-7 Garrett (2014) considers the case of a planner who is ignorant about the disutility of effort. With a maximin criterium over all possible disutility of effort, he shows that simple fixed-price-cost-reimbursement (FPCR) menu implements the robust solution in his case. 8 To ensure that the argument of the function ψ is always positive for all q ≥ 0 it suffices thatx ≤η.
terize the worst-case distribution F * , the distribution that minimizes the principal's payoff within F . In the following subsections we construct a Nash equilibrium of this game. We start by focusing in a subset of mechanisms that have a particular property: the ex-post payoff of the Principal is a piecewise linear function of the agent's type. A particular set of distributions, with the property that such piecewise linear mechanisms are optimal, is also characterized. We then find a Nash equilibrium that is composed of a strategy profile within these restricted sets.
Piecewise linear ex-post payoff
We start by focusing in a subset of mechanisms that have a particular property: the ex-post payoff of the Principal is a piecewise linear function of the agent's type. Linearity is directly connected with robust performance in the presence of average restrictions: the expected value of a linear function depends on the distribution solely through its expected value. In Carrasco et al. (2015) and Kos and Messner (2015) , it is shown that such mechanisms are optimal in a linear environment. We start by characterizing the set of piecewise linear mechanisms, which are indexed by the slope of the ex-post payoff function of the Principal. In subsection 4.3, we show that a mechanism with piecewise linear ex-post payoff is optimal by constructing a Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game featuring such a mechanism. In contrast with these papers where mechanisms with piecewise linear ex-post payoff can be solved directly in closed form, in the general nonlinear environment the description of allocation with piecewise linear ex-post payoffs is implicit through a differential system. We denote the ex-post payoff function of the Principal in a mechanism m = (q, t q ) by Π (θ) ≡ t q (θ) − c (q (θ)), which, by Lemma 1, is equal to
If the principal's ex-post payoff function is linear, with slope ξ > 0, on an open interval
for θ ∈ I. Condition (4) describes the allocation q (·) up to a constant. This degree of freedom is substituted by the condition that the allocation features no distortion at the top, which is a common result in mechanism design problems as this one. The reason for no distortion at the top is that the drive for allocative inefficiency in revenue problems is the desire to reduce information rents, which is absent for the highest type (type θ = 1 has the highest utility among types θ ∈ [0, 1]).
Formally, we study the following problem. For a fixed ξ > 0 we want to find a function q (·) such that s q (q (θ) , θ) > 0 and 1] . The following lemma fully characterizes the solution of the (ODE) ordinary differential equation (5). The proof of this result and the ones not presented in text are in the appendix.
Lemma 2. For each ξ > 0, (5) has a unique solution q ξ : θ ξ , 1 → [0, q 1 ], for some θ ξ ≥ θ, which satisfies the following properties: (i) zero quality at the bottom: q ξ θ ξ = 0;
(ii) strict monotonicity: dq ξ (θ) dθ > 0 for θ ∈ θ ξ , 1 ;
(iii) parameter dependence: q ξ (·) is decreasing and continuous in ξ;
(iv) limiting behavior: lim ξ→0 q ξ (θ) = q F B (θ) and lim ξ→∞ θ ξ = 1.
We extend the allocation to the interval [0, 1] by defining q ξ (θ) = 0, for θ ∈ 0, θ ξ . From the definition of the ODE (5) we must have that, for θ ∈ (θ ξ , 1], the associated ex-post payoff
So the function Π ξ is linear, with slope ξ, for type θ ∈ θ ξ , 1 . For types θ ∈ 0, θ ξ the ex-post payoff function is identically equal to zero as there is no production. We can see that from the following:
Hence, the ex-post payoff function has the following piecewise linear form:
Piecewise linearity means that characterization of Nature's payoff minimization problem is simple. The ex-post payoff function Π ξ (·) is convex and hence, by Jensen's inequality, the principal's expected payoff with the selling mechanism q ξ satisfies
for all F ∈ F. If θ ξ > k, zero expected payoff is obtained by the Dirac distribution δ k ∈ F.
Taking θ ξ ≤ k, the expected payoff from distribution F ∈ F is given by
This means that the Principal's expected payoff is minimized by any distribution F ∈ F with support contained in [θ ξ , 1]. This result is summarized in the following proposition.
and the minimal expected payoff is ξ k − θ ξ .
The class of supporting distributions
Proposition 1 characterizes the expected payoff guarantee the Principal obtains when restricting attention to mechanisms generating piecewise linear payoff functions. In order to show that a mechanism within this class is indeed optimal, we construct a class of distributions with the property that such a piecewise linear mechanisms are optimal. For any ξ > 0, define the function γ ξ : (0, 1) → R + given by
which is well defined given our assumptions, and define the following distribution
We denote as F ξ (1−) ≡ lim θ↑1 F ξ (θ) and, for θ ∈ θ ξ , 1 , f ξ (θ) ≡ d dθ F ξ (θ) as the density of the absolutely continuous part of the distribution F ξ . Notice that F ξ might not be in the set F for arbitrary ξ > 0. We later find a specific parameter ξ such that F ξ ∈ F. The next result shows that the class of distributions described above contains at least one distribution in F . This distribution will be part our Nash equilibrium construction.
Lemma 3. The following properties hold:
(i) ξ → 1 0 θdF ξ (θ) is continuous and strictly increasing function from (0, ∞) onto (θ, 1); (ii) there exists ξ * > 0 such that F ξ * ∈ F.
Main result
From now on we denote q ξ * , F ξ * , Π ξ * and θ ξ * as q * , F * , Π * and θ * , where ξ * is defined by Lemma 3 (ii). Our main result shows that this strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game.
Proposition 3. [Nash equilibrium] The pair (q * , F * ) is a Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game.
As previously mentioned, the characterization of the Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game gives us the best robust mechanism and the optimal robust payoff level. Corollary 1. The mechanism q * solves problem (3) and generates the following ex-post and expected payoffs for the Principal: Π * (θ) = ξ * [θ − θ * ] + and ξ * (k − θ * ).
We now discuss the content of the results we have just proved. First of all, we have that robustness imposes restrictions on how the designer's payoff can vary with the agents (reported) types. More precisely, the designer's ex-post payoff is piecewise linear, conditional on the allocation q ξ (θ) being strictly positive. The interpretation is that, knowing only the first moment of the distribution of types, the best way the designer has to protect herself against Nature is ensuring profits are linear in agent's types; or else Nature could move probability mass in a way that reduces the designer's expected payoffs. The shape of the principal's ex-post payoffs fully pins-down the robust allocation. Indeed, the allocation solves the ODE derived from the linearity of the principal's payoff conditional on positive allocation.
The worst-case distribution is derived from a condition that is analogous to the one that prevails in standard Bayesian mechanism design. In fact, in standard mechanism design problems, the designer equates the marginal social benefits of increasing q to the marginal cost of leaving informational rents to the agent. The worst-case distribution guarantees that this condition holds at the allocation that induces a piecewise linear payoff to the Principal. One feature of the robust mechanism is exclusion of an interval of types (i.e., zero allocation given the normalization assumption s(0, θ) = 0, for all θ). This is consistent with any Bayesian model as we remarked just after assumption Assumption 2.
Distortions and wedges
As in a standard Bayesian framework, the optimal robust allocation features distortions relative to the first best. The distortions lead to inefficiently low quality provision for all types except the highest one.
The optimal allocation satisfies, from (6), for any θ ∈ (θ * , 1),
From Lemma 2, we know that the allocation is strictly increasing: dq * dθ (θ) > 0, for all θ ∈ (θ * , 1). This means that the marginal surplus of quality is strictly positive, i.e., s q (q * (θ) , θ) > 0, for θ ∈ (θ * , 1), and hence the allocation q * (·) is inefficiently low. From (5), we known that quality provision for the highest type is efficient since q * (1) = q 1 = q F B (1) .
In what follows , we characterize how the level of distortions vary with the agent's type. We now introduce a local measure of distortions, which we call wedges. The robust wedge is defined as the marginal surplus from production at the robust allocation:
Considering the planner's problem of maximizing total surplus, the robust wedge represents the shadow cost of increasing the allocation delivered to a specific type so that inefficient allocation q * (·) is chosen. Clearly, at the first best allocation, wedges are zero. Hence, zero wedge is equivalent to the allocation being efficient. At the robust allocation, this prevails for θ = 1, so that w * (1) = 0. For all other types we know that the allocation is inefficiently low and hence satisfy w * (θ) > 0. Our next result shows that wedges are monotone in the optimal allocation for sufficiently high averages.
Proposition 4. The optimal allocation is efficient at the top, i.e., w * (1) = 0. There exists k 0 ∈ (θ, 1) such that, for all k ∈ [k 0 , 1), robust wedges are strictly positive and strictly decreasing:
for all θ ∈ (θ * , 1).
An example
Let us consider the monopolistic screening model of Mussa and Rosen (1978) with quadratic cost, i.e., u(q, θ) = θq and c(q) = q 2 /2, which is a special case of our monopolistic screening application. 9 For each mean k ∈ (0, 1) we find the Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game discussed in Proposition 3 in the following way: we numerically solve the differential equation (5) and find the slope parameter ξ * characterized by Lemma 3, which gives us the worst-case distribution given by (9) with ξ = ξ * .
For the particular case of a mean k = 1/2, we have that the multiplier ξ * is 0.268 and the cutoff θ * is 0.262. The first and second-best expected profits are 0.1666 and 0.0638. In figure  1 , the left graph depicts the first-best and robust allocations while the right one shows the wedge of the robust mechanism. We can also compute the robust (piecewise linear) revenue and the robust distribution associated to this solution, which are both depicted in the left and right-side of figure 2. 
Consequences of decreasing wedges
In standard non-linear mechanism design theory, the characterization of wedges or inefficiencies depends on assumptions made about the type distribution. In our model, in which a distribution is not given, we show that the robust mechanism features distortions that are monotone in the realized types for sufficiently high average. This result has important consequences in the applications discussed in Section 3. For example, in the taxation model we laid down, by the Taxation Principle (see Salanié (1998) ), wedges coincide with the marginal tax rate faced by the agent. Our result then implies that marginal tax rates are strictly decreasing in the income level of the agent. In the nonlinear pricing model considered, as well as the insurance model proposed, wedges represent the gap between the marginal price of quality/coverage in the optimal mechanism and the marginal cost of quality/coverage from the point of view of the seller. Our result shows that this gap decreases with the amount of consumption of the agent. In the special case where marginal costs are constant, this implies that the optimal mechanism features quantity discounts, i.e., the price of marginal quality decreases with the amount of "quality purchased". In the regulation example, monotonic wedges implies that firms with higher costs are faced with less powerful incentive schemes.
Conclusion
Our paper provides a new methodology for finding optimal robust mechanisms in nonlinear environments. Our characterization involves the solution of a differential system stemming from the linearity of the principal's ex-post payoff function in the agent's type at an optimal robust mechanism. We believe this same approach can be applied to other research questions of interest.
While allowing for nonlinear utilities over quality, we still consider a quasi-linear environment. This rules out some interesting examples such as optimal taxation environments where the trade-off between incentives and inequality are present. We also believe that the focus on a single moment, while important for tractability, might be too restrictive. Study of the robust problem with multiple moment conditions (or, more generally, general statistics such as quantiles) is yet another interesting dimension for extensions. This would allow one to characterize, for instance, the value of additional information to the Principal in a robust design problem.
We prove that k (q) ≥ 0. Let P (q) ≡ e q 1 q ξ −1 b(x)dx > 0. Then, (P k) ′ = P ′ k + k ′ P = −ξ −1 b (q) kP + k ′ P = P (−ξ −1 b (q) k + k ′ ) = −ξ −2 a (q) P ≤ 0.
Thus, P (q) k (q) ≥ P (q 1 ) k (q 1 ) = 0.
(iv): Let θ 0 (q) = lim ξ↓0 θ ξ (q) ≥ 0. Integrating the differential equation (10) we get 1 ≥ 1 − θ ξ (0) = θ ξ (q 1 ) − θ ξ (0) = If q < q ξ (θ) then s qθ (q, θ) > 0 and sq(q,θ) s qθ (q,θ) ≥ sq(q ξ (θ),θ) s qθ (q ξ (θ),θ) , which implies h q (q; θ) ≥ 0. Analogously, if q ∈ q ξ (θ) , q F B (θ) , then h q (q; θ) ≤ 0. For any q > q F B (θ), it is easy to see that h q (q; θ) < 0. Hence, q ξ (θ) maximizes h (·; θ) pointwise. Since q ξ ∈ Q and q ξ (θ) ≤ q F B (θ) ≤ q 1 , for all θ ∈ [0, 1], then q ξ is an optimal allocation.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. (i) From Lemma 2 (iii), this function is continuous and strictly increasing. Using (9), we have that 
Lemma 2 implies that θ ξ converges to 1 as ξ → ∞. This implies 1 0 θdF ξ (θ) → 1, as ξ → ∞. On the other hand, by Lemma 2, if ξ → 0 then q ξ (θ) → q F B (θ) and hence θ ξ → θ.
Convergence to the first-best allocation also implies that γ ξ (·) → ∞ as ξ → 0. Therefore, 1 0 θdF ξ (θ) → θ.
(ii) Since θ ξ (q) is continuous in ξ, for any q and k > θ, by the intermediate value theorem, there must exist ξ * > 0 such that 1 0 θdF ξ * (θ) = k .
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. First notice that F * has support [θ * , 1]. Proposition 1 implies that F * minimizes expected profits, given ex-post payoff function Π * . Lemma 2 implies that q * maximizes the Principal payoff, given distribution F * .
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. The wedge w (θ) = s q (q (θ) , θ) is decreasing if and only if (s q (q, θ (q))) ′ = s(q, θ) + s qθ θ ′ (q) < 0 Using (10) this condition is equivalent to s, θ ξ (q) + ξ −1 s qθ q, θ ξ (q) s, θ ξ (q) < 0, where we are making the dependence on ξ explicit. Since s1 , θ ξ (q 1 ) = s q (q 1 , 1) = 0 and s(q 1 , 1) < 0 (by Assumption Assumption 2), the inequality is true for θ ≥ θ ξ when ξ → ∞. If θ < θ ξ , then s(q, 0) + ξ −1 s qθ (q, 0) s q (q, 0) < 0.
By Lemma 3 (i), we have that the function ξ → 1 0 θdF ξ (θ) is continuous and strictly increasing from (0, ∞) into (θ, 1). Therefore, the result immediately follows.
